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Custom house guide: 1915-1916; location of general order stores and warehouses, steamship lines and piers, cargo districts, legal rates of storage; directory of departments, etc. Thirty-third edition. (New York: H. D. Chapman, 14 Reade St. Pp. 320. \$1.)

Fundamental investment principles. (Chicago: Investors Pub. Co. 1915. \$2.)

How to chart your business. (Chicago: Chart Stationery Co., 1015 Monroe Bldg. 1915.)

Lectures in the forum in industrial journalism at New York University, season of 1915, under the auspices of the New York Trade Press Association. (New York: Advertising & Selling Mag. 1915. Pp. 130. \$1.)

The library of factory management. Vol. III. *Materials and supplies.* Vol. V. *Operation and costs.* Vol. VI. *Executive control.* (Chicago: A. W. Shaw Co. 1915. \$3 each.)

Mechanics' lien laws of Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, with explanatory remarks and suggestions. (Minneapolis: Northwestern Lumbermen's Assoc. 1915. Pp. 44.)

Pennsylvania tax free bonds, classified. Seventh edition. (Philadelphia: Barclay, Moore & Co. Oct., 1915. Pp. 44.)

Zellers-Meyer interest calculator, maturity calculator and year calendar. (Hooper, Nebr.: The Zellers-Meyer Co. 1915. Pp. 27. 50c.)

Capital and Capitalistic Organization

The Trust Problem. By EDWARD DANA DURAND. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1915. Pp. 145.)

The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court. By WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1914. Pp. 133. \$1.25.)

Trusts and Competition. By JOHN FRANKLIN CROWELL. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company. 1915. Pp. 191. \$0.50.)

Of these three contributions to the literature of the trust problem, the first two deal with the relationship of the government to the trusts, while the third is a general discussion in condensed form of industrial monopolies. Dr. Durand's book—the outgrowth of a series of lectures originally given before the students of Harvard University—is easily the most far-reaching as well as the most philosophic discussion of the questions connected with government regulation of trusts that has appeared in recent years. For this task the author possessed unusual qualifications. His training as an economist gave him the necessary intellectual equipment to analyze the problem into its constituent parts. His experience in

the Bureau of Corporations furnished him with a body of facts sufficiently broad and significant to illuminate his analysis with concrete illustrations and to prevent him from falling into the errors so common with the less well informed.

Dealing only with industrial consolidations with monopolistic power, Dr. Durand sees but three possible methods of procedure; first, the prevention of unfair competition and the withdrawal of special privileges; second, the regulation of prices and profits; and, third, the destruction of existing trusts and the prevention of the formation of any such organizations in the future. The first method, so ably presented and advanced by Professor J. B. Clark, the author believes may be used as an adjunct of either of the other two, but is distrustful of its efficacy when used alone. He is convinced that industrial monopolies are both possible and probable, even under a régime where neither special privileges nor unfair competition exist. The policy of regulating prices or profits he holds would very probably end in government ownership. The merits of government ownership Dr. Durand does not discuss; but, as he points out, such an outcome is necessarily a product of the future, and meanwhile, until such a result should be reached, the dangers and difficulties attendant upon a program of price regulation would be in full operation. As a result of these and other considerations, the author concludes that destruction of existing trusts and the prevention of prospective consolidations is the only solution of the question that merits serious attention. Both of these desiderata are, in his judgment, entirely feasible. The appendix contains all of the federal anti-trust acts. There is no index, an omission that is somewhat pardonable on account of the essential unity of the discussion as a whole.

The principal object of Mr. Taft's argument is to show that the recent decisions of the Supreme Court have transformed the Sherman anti-trust act into a statute in complete harmony with the historic principles of the common law and consequently into an administrative and judicial weapon sufficiently comprehensive and adequate to answer all the requirements that may be demanded of it in furnishing a complete solution of the problems connected with industrial monopolies. The first chapters are devoted to a short but enlightening presentation of the principles of the common law relating to individual rights of property, contract, and labor. A second section of the book deals with the narrowing effect of the Sugar Trust decision, and the unfortunate interpretation given the act in

the railway traffic cases. A third section reviews the decisions in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases, and holds that as a result of the promulgation of the "rule of reason" the statute has again been brought into conformity with the original principles of the common law. The author is a firm believer in the efficacy of the procedure in equity as a method of enforcing the anti-trust laws and furthermore contends that serious dangers would result from the use of the drastic methods so often advocated. The case for the Sherman act as interpreted by the decisions of the Supreme Court during the period 1910 to 1914 is presented with a full knowledge of the legal principles involved and a cogency that must command the attention of every student of the question, whether he be an economist, a statesman, or a lawyer. Nevertheless, it is to be observed, the author's conclusions are at direct variance with those reached by Dr. Durand.

The third book is an analysis of the trust régime, rather than a constructive program for the control of industrial consolidations. It is therefore broader in its scope, aiming to present in brief but logical form the issues involved in "big business" and "to induce straighter thinking and sharper discrimination in the consideration of public questions." It is not philosophical, like Durand's; it is not legal, like Taft's; it is analytical and informative. As one would expect from an editor of the *Wall Street Journal*, the author sees in the great combinations a natural, logical evolution, but at the same time the inequitable practices and dangerous tendencies that naturally attend their development. On the whole one must conclude that Dr. Crowell, unlike Dr. Durand, is inclined to believe that the elimination of special privileges and unfair practices would prove a fairly workable program. Unlike Mr. Taft, however, the author is a firm believer in the desirability of supplementing the judicial control exercised through the Supreme Court by administrative control through the Federal Trade Commission.

While it is always easier to criticise than to construct, attention may properly be called to certain faults and discrepancies, such as attributing to trusts a dominant position in certain fields of service (p. 2) and later affirming that these organizations derive their power to exploit the market from their charters or from contracts with competitors (p. 66). In crediting to the New Jersey anti-trust law of 1913 the most elaborate definition of the trust, the author is in one sense strictly accurate; and yet in justice he should have directed attention to the fourteen states that have

adopted substantially the same definition, and especially acknowledgment should have been given to the Texas statute of 1889, the progenitor of the definition to which Dr. Crowell refers. On the whole, however, the book is an accurate portrayal of facts and tendencies; and, considering the narrow compass into which the subject is compressed, a worthy addition to the National Social Science Series.

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Voting Trusts. A Chapter in Recent Corporate History. By HARRY A. CUSHING. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1915. Pp. 226. \$1.50.)

This is a scientific study of a single aspect of modern corporation finance. As such it is thorough, balanced, and, within its limits, exhaustive. The value of the study is its painstaking review of the great body of historical and current facts bearing on the subject and the judicial poise of the author's judgments. There are no hot-headed generalizations so common in studies dealing with the border-lands between business and public policy.

A voting trust arises when all or a majority of the stock of a corporation is assigned to a small group of men for a period of years or until dividends on the stock have been declared or until some other clearly defined event has transpired. During the period the trustees of the stock manage the corporation. In case dividends are declared they pass these over to the real owners. The fundamental purpose—a purpose which Mr. Cushing does not emphasize sufficiently—is to give to a corporation a responsible and publicly acknowledged administration. As this end is most needful at a time of financial wreck, the voting trust has been used, in the vast majority of cases, during the period immediately following reorganization. At such times, as Cushing succinctly states, this insures stability of policy and responsible management, and prevents disturbing interference by minority stockholders (p. 98). Except in very rare cases voting trustees have not abused their power and in many cases—notably that of Northern Pacific Railway—the voting trustees have voluntarily surrendered their trust as soon as they felt the property had so far recovered as to be beyond the reaches of speculative raids.

The author includes a long chapter on the legality of voting trusts, but this does not leave the reader with a very clear idea of the situation. He lays altogether too much emphasis on the un-